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3 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/CD

THRU: CIA Top Secret Control Officer
Chief, General Services

FROM: [REDACTED] Organization and Methods Examiner [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Survey of CIA Top Secret
Control System

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- I. Objectives of Survey.
- II. Status of Survey.
- III. Interim Recommendations.
- IV. Proposed Schedule for Remainder of Survey.

I. Objectives of Survey.

- a. Recommendation of Methods for:
 - (1) Inventory of all Top Secret Documents;
 - (2) Review of Documents for Purposes of Downgrading;
 - (3) Assuring Proper Degree of Control of Top Secret Documents, both Central and Area.
- b. Appraisal of Staffing Requirements for Central Top Secret Control Office.
- c. Recommendations Concerning Work Methods in Central Top Secret Control Office.
- d. Recommendation on Procedures used in Area Top Secret Control Stations.

II. Status of Survey.

The examiner has spent ten working days, to date, in the Central Top Secret Control Office reviewing the responsibilities of the office, the methods of operation, the workload, and the backlog. Recommendations contained in this Interim Report will be confined,

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Security Information

Page 2.

therefore, to the Central Top Secret Control Office. The examiner has been most favorably impressed with the efficiency, initiative, and cooperativeness of the staff of the Central Top Secret Control Office. Each member of the staff is trained to perform all duties of the office when necessary although specific duties have been allocated for normal operation. There is a singular lack of duplication of effort, records, etc. The supervisor constantly reviews office procedures to insure up-to-date methods of operation. The weaknesses and/or omissions in the work methods of this office seem to stem completely from a lack of personnel, plus the build-up over a period of years of a backlog of files material which must be identified, recorded and stored or destroyed.

III. Interim Recommendations.

Listed below is a report of progress made, to date, toward realization of the objectives of the survey.

- (1) Inventory.—Cannot be undertaken without additional staff in Central Top Secret Control Office (see III, b., (2)).
- (2) Review for Downgrading Purposes.—Should be a component part of the Agency-wide inventory.
- (3) Proper Degree of Control.—(a) Initial control and dissemination to Area Stations of all CIA finished intelligence reports and all documents from outside agencies rests with the Central Top Secret Control Office. These documents are identified by 6-digit CIA document numbers. If the document is transmitted by an Area Station to another Area or to an outside agency, the transaction is listed in the weekly Area log, a copy of which is forwarded to Central Top Secret Control. In order to have complete central control of a 6-digit document, each transaction should be posted from the Area log to the Central Posting Record which contains the history of each copy number of each Top Secret document. Due to a shortage of staff, transmission of a document of the 6-digit series beyond the original recipient is not recorded. Hence, central control is not complete and, while this omission of posting is not a security violation, location of a document involves a time-consuming search of records and a series of tracer calls. Additional staff to perform this weekly posting function would be a considerable time and staffing economy and

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Security Information

Page 3.

would greatly facilitate periodic inventories.

- (b) Initial control and dissemination of documents originated in an Area rests with the Area Top Secret Control Officer. These documents are identified by 5-digit CIA document numbers. All transactions wherein such a document moves out of an Area to another Area, internally from office to office, or to an outside agency are entered on the weekly Area log. Central Top Secret Control posts all such transactions to a Posting Record. Copies of all such documents (with the exception of sensitive material which by prior determination should be seen by a limited few) should be sent to Central Top Secret Control for record. At present, only about 20 per cent of these documents are sent forward. Central TSC lacks personnel to permit follow-up to obtain these documents.
- (c) The examiner and the CTSC Officer are at present developing a system for follow-up on a document transmitted from an Area to assure that it has reached its destination within a reasonable time. The suspense and follow-up will be based on the Area logs.

b. Staffing Requirements of Central Top Secret Control Office.

- (1) It is recommended that immediate recruitment of a GS-3 or GS-4 be initiated for the Central TSC office as an additional clerk, to enable this office to (a) establish a complete posting operation, (b) follow-up on transmission of documents and submission of record copies by Areas, (c) have source (Intellofax) cards prepared on each document, (d) eliminate overtime work currently necessary to keep abreast of daily workload.
- (2) It is recommended that the Personnel Office be requested to provide two clerks on detail from elsewhere in CIA for a period of three months to assist the Central Top Secret Control Office in a physical inventory of all Top Secret documents from the inception of CIA to the present time, initiation of a review of documents for purposes of downgrading, and elimination of a backlog of microfilms and obsolete documents which should be cataloged, stored or destroyed.

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Security Information

Page 4.

- (3) It is suggested that after completion of the above work and re-alignment of duties as a result of one permanent addition to the staff, another brief survey be made to determine whether staff is adequate to carry on the current work, permit periodic inventories and reviews of documents, and periodic visits by the CTSC supervisor to Area Stations to insure proper Area control of documents and uniformity of operation.

c. Work Methods in Central Top Secret Control Office.

Frequent contacts are necessary between this office and the Liaison Division and the Analysis Branch of the Library in daily operation. The latter offices will move to another building in April. Hence, a new daily schedule for these contacts is being worked out.

The examiner has carefully examined each procedure, form, filing system, etc. and has made only minor suggestions for improvement. In collaboration with the Central Top Secret Control Officer, the possibilities of use of IBM cards, combination of certain records into one form, more extensive use of rubber stamps, etc. have been thoroughly investigated. The CTSC Officer has developed improved Posting Records and Cover Sheets which will be submitted separately.

A system of "flagging" the Posting Record with colored tabs to replace several suspense files presently in use is being evolved.

The examiner has prepared a rather detailed listing of functions performed by the Central Top Secret Control Office in the process of this survey, from which a Procedures Manual could be prepared if the addressees approve. It is believed such a manual would be useful to Area Stations and in the training of new personnel.

d. Procedures in Area Top Secret Control Stations.

It is recommended that the examiner be instructed to proceed immediately to a survey of Area Top Secret Control Stations for the purpose of (1) reporting on procedures and degree of control in each Area, (2) proposing a uniform system with the necessary degree of flexibility in each Area, (3) assisting in solution of unique problems by Area.

IV. Proposed Schedule for Remainder of Survey.

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- a. Survey of Area Top Secret Control Stations.
- b. Preparation of Procedures Manual.
- c. Preparation of Plan for Inventory and Downgrading.